On the 4th of August 2026, His Honour Judge Monty KC (“HHJ Monty KC”), sitting at the Central London County Court, handed down his judgment in the case of Clarke v Royal Borough of Greenwich, a homelessness appeal brought under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996. HHJ Monty KC allowed the appeal. 1MCB’s Miranda Grell acted for Mr Clarke, the Appellant. Miranda was instructed by JI Solicitors.
Background to the appeal
In August 2025, Mr Clarke became homeless. He made a homeless application to his local council, the Royal Borough of Greenwich (“the local authority”), to try and obtain housing assistance.
In the vulnerability questionnaire that Mr Clarke completed as part of the local authority’s enquiries into whether he was in ‘priority need’ under section 189 of the Housing Act, Mr Clarke wrote:
“I am a Black gay man with no family support. Cultural and identity factors mean I cannot rely on family for care or accommodation, leaving me isolated and significantly more vulnerable than most applicants.”
After the local authorities completed its enquiries, it decided that Mr Clarke was not in ‘priority need.’
Mr Clarke requested a review of the decision (“the section 184 decision”) not to find him in priority need. His solicitors made representations about his mental health and/or suicidal ideation but they did not make any additional representations about Mr Clarke’s sexual orientation and/or race.
Following the local authority’s review conducted under section 202 of the Housing Act 1996, it upheld its section 184 decision not to find Mr Clarke in ‘priority need.’
Mr Clarke appealed to the County Court.
The Appeal
Mr Clarke’s grounds of appeal were essentially that the local authority failed to take into account his protected characteristics as a Black and gay man and the increased risk to him as a Black gay man if and when homeless.
In support of his grounds of appeal, Mr Clarke’s solicitors filed a detailed witness statement appending independent reports that provided verified, statistical data on the increased risk to people who are LGBTQIA+ when they are homeless, in the UK and abroad.
The reports further highlighted the even greater risk to homeless gay and queer people who from Black and Minority Ethnic backgrounds.
Even though Mr Clarke’s solicitors had not raised his protected characteristics of sexual orientation and/race in the representations they had made to the local authority, following the section 184 decision, HHJ Monty KC allowed Mr Clarke’s appeal.
HHJ Monty KC held at paragraphs 64 to 70 of the judgment that:
“64. It is also clear that the review request did not raise – expressly – issues of race or sexual orientation. I have set out what was said in that request earlier in my judgment.
65. I accept that when considering a section 204 appeal a court should be wary of imposing on the officer a duty to enquire into matters that were not raised in the course of the review: see Cramp and the passage at [14] to which I have referred earlier.
66. However, it seems to me that when conducting a review, the officer cannot ignore matters which are not expressly raised in a review request on the grounds that the matters were dealt with in the section 184 decision where those matters are so intertwined with those which have been made the subject of a review; to do so – and in particular, not even to mention those matters on review – would in my view be an error of law.
67. In my judgment, the officer has unfortunately fallen into error here. There was a failure to reference in the review decision Mr Clarke’s protected characteristics and how they might relate to Mr Clarke’s depression and suicidal ideation. If that was because the officer felt no need to do so because it had been adequately dealt with in the section 184 decision, it seems to me that the least the officer should have done would have been to say just that.
68. The protected characteristics of this particular individual either did or might directly impact on the risk of being homeless in a way which arguably is greater for Mr Clarke than (for example) a white straight man. I say this irrespective of the information in the three additional documents, although it seems to me that these underline this point. The failure to mention these matters, and how in the view of the officer they might or might not impact on the question of vulnerability, was in my view an error of law.
69. These matters are not new in the sense of being raised for the first time on appeal; they are inherently connected to the question of Mr Clarke’s vulnerability. In my view it was incumbent on the officer to have considered them even if they were not expressly raised in the review request.
70. It might have been different if, for example, Mr Clarke had raised his ethnicity and sexual orientation as relevant matters for the first time in the context of this appeal; but he did not. It was always a central part of what he was saying to the Respondent. I accept of course that the weight to be given to any particular matter is for the Respondent, but if a matter is simply not mentioned, it is impossible to say that any consideration has been given to it at all.”
The full judgment of Clarke v Royal Borough of Greenwich is available to read and download HERE.
Miranda Grell is a barrister in 1MCB’s civil team. Her profile is available to read HERE.
